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Abstract:   The study of general election outcomes can be helped by finding better 
approaches for visualizing large quantities of information and asking questions about 
its patterning. We review the Nagayama or ‘all possibilities’ triangle display, and 
show that it can only be legitimately used to show an overall ‘field’ of results that is 
logically feasible, called the effective space of competition, which varies with the 
number of observable parties. We apply this reductionist view to analyse outcomes in 
three leading plurality rule systems (the USA, India and Great Britain), focusing on 
evidence of the Duvergerian psychological effect acting on voters during campaign 
periods. The ECS view illuminates some key differences across countries, and 
variations with rising numbers of parties competing. We next consider a more holistic 
approach, the ‘crown’ diagram, which links electoral district outcomes more closely 
to the most important politico-ideological dimension in each country. Both views 
suggest some tentative evolutionary hypotheses for the variegated development of 
plurality rule systems over time. Britain is a highly nationalized party system, but one 
that has moved substantially away from Duvergerian predictions of two-party 
focusing, and towards multi-party politics. The USA seems to be a case of ‘stunted 
development’. And India shows a partial Duvergerian conformity, yet combined with 
a substantial vertical scatter of non-Duvergerian results. Applications to over-time and 
regional analysis within countries are also sketched. 
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In the comparative analysis of elections and party systems we have yet to develop 
logically acceptable ways to chart the district-level outcomes of multi-party elections, 
and to assess the clustering or patterning of outcomes in systematic ways. In this 
paper we show that the Nagayama or ‘all possibilities’ triangle has major defects, but 
can be reformulated and re-applied in two new ways. The first captures the ‘layer 
cake’ character of general election outcomes in a reductionist fashion, showing how 
the number of observable parties competing for votes at district level influences 
outcomes. An alternative variant (the crown diagram) gives a more holistic picture of 
outcomes, shifting attention to the performance of the top two parties or blocs linked 
to the predominant political-ideological dimension in a political system. We link this 
second innovation to a tentative logic of evolutionary development applicable to 
plurality rule election systems.  
 
 
1. Graphic representations of multi-party competition 
 
In his discussion of ‘paradigms’ in science, Thomas Kuhn (1996) emphasized that the 
term is meant to cover not just very basic or fundamental ideas that may lie at the 
heart of salient encompassing theory changes, but also to whole congeries (or 
‘swarms’) of complementing ideas, methods, and practices, many of which concern 
instrumentation, measurement, schemas, and the analysis, representation and 
visualization of data (Buchanan, 2000, p. 233-4). There are still widespread problems 
of defective instrumentation in political science, especially in electoral studies, where 
there has tended to be an over-reliance on a few key statistics with known 
inadequacies, such as the ENP score (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003; Golosov, 2010). 
We also repeatedly admonish each other to make more use of visualizations so as to 
deepen our intuitive grip on complex data patterns (Tufte, 2001; 1997; 1990). And we 
know that the capacity for useful abstraction and visualization are closely linked 
(Arnheim, 1969). Yet in fact no clear set of charting tools has emerged for general 
election outcomes or secured regular usage in analysing multi-party elections.  
In his leading text The Geometry of Voting (1994), a range of influential 
papers, and some more accessible treatments like Chaotic Elections (2001) Donald 
Saari popularized the use of an equilateral triangle simplex to display the results of a 
three party election. Figure 1 shows the basic set up here, with each of the vertices 
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assigned to represent 100 per cent for one player and zero for the other two, and with 
the votes decreasing for a particular player the further one moves away from their 
vertex. For example, along the whole AC axis here, B gets zero votes, but B’s vote 
share increases the nearer the election outcome gets to the B vertex. The mid point of 
the triangle represents an even three-way division of the votes.  
Figure 1: The simplex representation of a three-party election 
 
A
= 100%
C = 100%
B = 100%
(0, 50, 50)(50, 0, 50)
(0, 25, 75)
(0, 75, 25)
(25, 0, 75)
(75, 0, 25)
(25, 75, 0)(50, 50, 0)(75, 25, 0)
(33.3, 33.3, 33.3)
 
 
 
Notes: All co-ordinates show vote shares as (A, B, C) 
 
   
 Influential authors have argued for the use of a simplex representation to 
display general election results (Grofman et al, 2004), and yet this approach has in 
fact been relatively little employed for two reasons. In terms of practicalities, it seems 
to be not all that intuitive to locate particular voting outcomes on the simplex field. In 
addition, the political space tends to appear compressed as you get closer to an even 
three-way competition. This limitation is evident if we use the triangle to show 
aggregate election results. Normally the most populated central parts of the triangle 
just disappear behind a mass of overlapping constituency outcomes, rendering pattern-
finding difficult.  
Second, although Saari enthusiastically advocated an expanded (fold-out) 
simplex version for analysing four-party contests, this idea has not been picked up at 
all outside his own work, because the four-dimension representation is additionally 
complex to understand and use. Of course, at five parties and above this form of 
diagrammatic representation becomes completely infeasible. So Saari’s suggested 
route also seems to be one that is inherently incapable of handling multi-party 
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systems.1 Yet multi-party systems are everywhere the coming trend in liberal 
democracies, outside the USA. 
 An alternative ‘all possibilities’ triangle display (or APT) shows electoral 
district outcomes in general election results. It was pioneered by Nagayama2 and has 
been energetically promoted by Grofman et al (2004) and Taagepera (2004, 2007). As 
Figure 2 shows the display seems to be simplicity itself, the horizontal axis showing 
V1, the vote share of the largest party (from 0 to 100 per cent), and the vertical axis 
V2, the vote share of the second largest party (from 0 to 50 per cent). The triangle is 
defined by the horizontal axis and the two boundary lines here, V1=V2 and  
V1 + V2 = 100. They intersect where V2 equals 50, the logical maximum for the 
second largest party under any pattern of competition. A considerable problem of the 
APT is that V1 and V2 can both win votes from, or lose votes to, other parties whose 
support is not shown explicitly. None the less Taagepera (2004, 2007) has argued that 
these displays can also be used to chart the distribution of vote shares for the third-, 
fourth- or fifth-largest parties (peaking at 33.33, 25 or 20 per cent respectively), where  
 
Figure 2: The ‘all possibilities’ triangle display (after Grofman et al) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
these are particular foci of interest.3   
The ‘all possibilities’ triangle has mostly been used visually to offer intuitive 
explanations. Thus a cluster of seats outcomes close to the left-hand boundary in 
Figure 2 indicates multi-party competition, while a bunching of outcomes close to the 
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right-hand boundary of the APT shows a polarized party system, with just two leading 
contenders (see Reed, 1990, 2001, 2003; and Diwakar, 2006). Grofman et al (2004) 
advocate sub-dividing the triangle display and counting the distribution of electoral 
district outcomes across the partitions thus created is a useful additional means of 
generating quantitative data for comparisons across elections. Figure 2 shows their 
recommended sub-divisions, created by lines set in from the two sloping triangle 
boundary lines by 20 per cent and by a vertical line through V1 = 50.  Grofman et al 
frankly admit that these internal partitions are completely ad hoc. Yet they suggest 
that the percentage of electoral district results falling into the different compartments 
should be used as a new variable in further quantitative analysis. In their view, the 
percentage of results in compartments ABC in Figure 2 above can be taken as 
indicating bipolarized results, while the proportion in FGH indicates multi-party 
results. This suggestion has been taken up by a few authors (for instance, 
Likhtenchtein and Yarmgomskaya (2005) and Diwakar (2007). 
The problem here lies in interpreting the APT boundaries in absolute terms, as 
a fixed framework applicable in an unchanging way across very different competitive 
contexts. In Grofman et al, and other authors following their lead (such as Taagepera, 
2004, 2007) there seems to be a background assumption that although a uniform 
distribution of districts across the whole triangle space is highly unlikely, it is none 
the less logically feasible. When analysts present a scatterplot of general election 
outcomes data situated only within the APT frame, the empirical patterns of seats is 
implicitly being compared with a potentially uniform distribution.  
Yet in fact, we use the ‘all possibilities triangle’ label partly as a warning sign, 
because for any single contest large areas of the triangle necessarily cannot be 
populated with results.4 For a whole set of contests, for instance across a display of all 
districts at a general election, a somewhat larger area of the APT will be logically 
feasible (because competition outcomes are more diverse). But even here, the feasible 
area can only ever encompass a fraction of the whole APT area, depending on the 
number of parties competing in the election. For these reasons fixed compartments 
such as those in Figure 2 are in fact particularly inappropriate. They will necessarily 
confuse some technical or mathematical effects within multi-party competition with 
substantive empirical patterns. Put another way, within the all possibilities triangle 
display there is no way of discriminating between feasible but empirically 
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unpopulated positions or slots, and those V1V2 slots that are just not logically 
feasible, given the configuration of parties competing. 
 
2. Effective competition space 
The problems above can be completely avoided by introducing the concept of 
effective competition space (ECS), defined here as ‘the set of all possible V1V2 
outcomes that are logically possible in a given election situation’. The key insight 
needed is that the patterns associated with elections and party competition are not 
measured against an unchanging canvass. Instead, we have to see the shape of the 
outcomes as produced only within a specific field of possibilities, a field that itself 
changes with the number of parties competing for votes. 
To make any progress at all in analysing this field, we also need to make a 
simplifying assumption about choosing a measuring instrument or grid. The problem 
here is analogous to Mandelbrot’s famous (1967) paper on measuring the English 
coastline, where the length we come up with responds to the granularity of our 
measuring stick. We necessarily must have a unit of measurement, and this choice 
conditions our answer in some degree, hence we can only chart ‘effective’ 
competition space given that choice. To keep things simple, we assume here a 
‘positive integer universe’, that is, one where all ‘observable parties’ have vote shares 
that are natural numbers of 1 or more, and where there are no decimal vote shares. 
This useful simplifying approach has already been pioneered in the context of 
legislatures by Laver and Benoit (2003) and Benoit and Laver (2005). Hence we 
require by definition that any ‘observable’ party competing in elections must get at 
least 1 per cent of the votes (if it gets less it is definitionally not ‘observable’).  
Thus the number of observable parties (hereafter Nop) is the number of parties 
with 1 per cent or more of the votes. This move is essential if we are to be able to 
economically trace determinant interactions between party numbers and vote shares 
on the one hand and changes in competition space on the other hand. In empirical 
analysis the approach can be simply adapted to cope with sub-1 per cent parties or 
candidates by adding a composite ‘other’ term to hold these vote shares. However, in 
what follows it remains important for readers not to lose sight of the fact that the 
‘effective’ E in ECS signals an important limitation. 
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We begin by re-picturing the APT display above, but adding in two other 
measures that it also shows, but which have not been noted by previous authors 
(Figure 3a). First, within the integer universe assumption, we can only draw the 
triangle at all on the assumption that there are three or more parties in competition. 
Hence on the top right hand boundary of the APT the amount of votes going to the 
third and subsequent parties is 1 per cent (assuming three-party competition), and this 
increases as we move down and to the left, reaching a maximum of 98 per cent at the 
far left-hand point of the triangle (assuming 100 parties in competition). Clearly then 
the APT display incorporates all possibilities, including of course all shifts in the 
number of parties in competition. 
The second dimension shown in Figure 3a runs downwards from the top left-
hand boundary, along which the largest and second largest parties get the same vote 
shares (and hence V1 minus V2 is zero). As we move down to the right, so the largest 
party’s lead over its chief competitor increases, and the V1-V2 gap reaches a 
maximum (of 98 per cent) at the bottom right-hand point of the APT. Note that the 
measuring scales on the two hypotenuses here are compatible with each other. But 
they are different from the scales for V1 and V2 (which are also compatible with each 
other). 
For a number of technical and substantive reasons (that will become clearer 
below), it is useful to re-present the APT making the ‘V1 lead over V2’ dimension 
into the horizontal axis, and the ‘Total votes for V3..VN’ into the vertical axis. As 
Figures 3b and 3c show, this entails first flipping the conventional APT downwards 
along its horizontal axis, and then rotating the flipped triangle clockwise by 45 
degrees. This produces a right angle triangle, where the hypotenuse measures V1 
downwards (from 1 at the top to 98 at the bottom), and where V2 is measured as the 
normal from the hypotenuse (where V2 is a minimum 1 per cent) to a maximum (of 
49 per cent) at the bottom right corner. 
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Within this re-presented APT space we can now define the empirical 
boundaries of the effective competition space shown in Figure 4 for any given number 
of parties in competition and contrast them with the APT itself as follows: 
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 Effective competition 
space (ECS) 
All possibilities 
triangle (APT) 
Left boundary (I to II) V2 = V1 (part) V2 = V1 (whole) 
Top right boundary (I to III)  V2 = (100-V1)/(N-1) V2 = 0 
Bottom boundary(II to III) V2 = 100 – V1 – (N-2) V2  = 100 – V1 
 
Figure 4: The size and shape of the ECS area at 3, 10 and 50 observable parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The ECS as proportion of the V1V2 slots in the APT area is at its maximum at 10 and 11 
observable parties.  
 
 
 
While the APT display remains completely invariant, the effective competition space 
for a single contest is always necessarily a sub-set of the APT, and its shape can vary 
greatly. With only two parties in competition, the ECS is just the bottom boundary of 
the APT. But it becomes a triangular space as soon as 3 parties compete, shown by the 
yellow shaded area in Figure 4. The size of competition space (measured in terms of 
integer V1-V2 slots) then increases to reach a maximum extent with 10 or 11 parties 
competing (shown shaded blue in Figure 4). From there the ECS gradually decreases 
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in size as the incrementally-rising bottom boundary increasingly squeezes the feasible 
space from below. The ECS takes up only around a third of the APT at 50 parties 
(shown shaded pink in Figure 4. And by 100 parties (the maximum in our integer 
universe) the competition space shrinks to a single dot at the top of the APT.  
 A clear implication of Figure 4 is that we need to establish how many parties 
are competing in different districts, before the pattern of election results can be 
sensibly mapped onto the background competition space. For example, in a three-
party race the maximum size of the third party vote is 33 per cent, and there is only a 
single chance (out of 833 possible V1-V2 slots with three-party competition) that a 
district outcome can end up at this point.  With four parties, the maximum on the 
vertical axis is 50 per cent (if all four parties get 25 per cent), then 60 per cent with 
five parties, 80 per cent with ten parties etc. In addition, the bottom of the ECS moves 
upwards by one slot with each extra party competing. With three observable parties 
the lower ECS boundary is at 1 per cent, rising to 8 per cent at 10 parties, and 48 per 
cent at 50 parties.  
 A key context here is Maurice Duverger’s (1951) influential discussion of the 
‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ effects operating on voters, party elites and potential 
counter-elites so as to sustain two-party competition in plurality rule systems. Table 1 
shows an expanded version of this argument, which leads to twin predictions  
A: that when an election campaign starts, voters will have few (perhaps just 
     two) choices of candidates to choose from; and 
B: that when voters cast their actual ballots they will assign little or no support 
     to smaller parties. Hence, the number of observable parties (passing the 1 
     per  cent level) is small and the aggregate level of support for parties 
     ranked third or subsequently in each district is diminutive. (These effects 
     automatically imply that ENPvotes is also small, close to or below 2).5 
Notice that prediction B rests solely on the campaign psychological effect acting on 
voters alone, and not on the behaviours of leaders, funders or activists. By this stage, 
the decisions of elites or counter-elites to stay loyal, break away or stand candidates 
against the major parties are by now all made, and so they cannot further affect 
campaign outcomes. Prediction B is the focus of most of the analysis below.  
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Table 1: The mechanical and psychological impacts of plurality rule elections on 
party competition, according to Duverger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately some methods of analysis risk confounding together the 
separate stages in Table 1, and take no account of changes in competition space. 
Calculating effective number of party scores without paying attention to the feasible 
competition space is potentially misleading. For instance, Chhibber and Kolman 
(2004, p. 48-9) count any ENP score of 2.5 or less as evidence supportive of 
Duverger’s (1951) ‘Law’. But it should be clear that if only two (observable) parties 
contest seats (as in many US Congressional districts), no seat can have an ENP score 
exceeding 2. Even with three observable parties, the odds of a district outcome 
As beforeAs beforeAs beforeMechanical effect - after 
election 2
The Number of observable parties (Nop) is small, 
with little support for third and subsequent parties. (Hence
ENPvotes is automatically low, close to or below 2).
Prediction B
Voters fear that 
smaller parties present 
on the ballot are going 
to be ineffective, and 
so fail to vote for them 
Psychological effect during 
the campaign period for 
election 2 
The number of parties standing candidates
in each local electoral district is small (perhaps just 2)
Prediction A
Voters fear that 
smaller parties are 
going to be ineffective. 
Voters fail to express 
support for these 
parties in opinion polls, 
by-elections, or 
‘secondary’ elections
Counter-elites fear that 
efforts to start-up new 
parties or back existing 
smaller parties will fail 
– so candidates and 
finance are hard for 
such parties to attract. 
Hence smaller parties 
stand few (effective or 
competitive) 
candidates.
Dissenting sub-leaders 
remain inside the 
ranks of  major parties, 
fearing  that 
breakaway parties 
would be electoral 
suicide
Psychological effect in the 
election run-up period -
prior to the start of election 
2
Votes cast for smaller 
parties are recognized 
by voters as 
ineffective, failing to 
convert into 
representation
Smaller parties are 
radically under-
represented in the 
legislature, given their 
vote shares - winning 
no or few seats
Major parties are 
disproportionately 
rewarded with seats, 
given their vote shares
Mechanical effect - after 
election 1
VotersPotential counter-
elites
Major party elitesImpacts from plurality 
rule elections
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achieving a 2.5 ENP score are necessarily very slender indeed, and the chances of 
achieving less than this level are very high. So the problems here are fundamental 
ones. Essentially, we cannot disentangle the campaign psychological effect acting on 
voters alone without taking account of ECS variations.  
In this analysis we restrict attention to three of the world’s leading plurality 
rule electoral systems, widely thought to share a Duvergerian tendency for two-party 
predominance – the USA (now almost the only perfect two-party system still in 
being), and India and Britain. Plurality rule electoral systems also have other have 
important continuities in terms of how the election system shapes competition 
(Shugart, 2005; Cox, 1997). All three countries use plurality rule in single-member 
local districts, with 435 districts in the US House of Representatives; 534 seats in 
Indian lower house, the Lok Sabha; and 628 seats in the House of Commons for Great 
Britain (but excluding Northern Ireland, which has its own distinct party system).  
We focus on outcomes in 2005 or 2006 general elections. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of the number of ‘observable’ parties contesting districts. In the USA the 
number of parties or candidates with 1 per cent of the local vote ranged across 
districts from 2 to 5 candidates (although two-party predominance remained pervasive 
in terms of vote shares and seat wins), in India from 2 to 11 parties, and in Britain 
from 3 to 8 parties (with no two-party contests at all). Because even a 1 per cent vote 
share may need to be built up over time, these results already show quite different 
outcomes in terms of prediction A and a part of prediction B in Table 1 above. The 
patterns suggest strong disincentives for new or small parties in the USA, only a weak 
effect in India, and virtually no effect in Great Britain. 
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Table 2: The percent of all election districts with different number of 
‘observable’ parties in UK, Indian and US elections in the mid 2000s. 
 
 
Election districts with 
a given Nop (ie parties 
receiving 1% or more 
of local votes)  
United States, 
House of 
Representatives 
2006 
Indian general 
election 2004 
Great Britain, 
general election 
2005 
One   7.8             0             0 
Two 52.6   3.87             0 
Three 29.0 13.81   3.50 
Four   9.2 23.39 32.32 
Five   0.7 26.70 41.08 
Six   0.2           18.42 17.52 
Seven   0.2   8.66   4.94 
Eight    0.2   3.13   0.64 
Nine or more                0    2.03             0 
Total           100%         100%         100% 
No of cases             435           546           628 
 
 
 The patterning of party competition in the USA is the most straightforward to 
represent, as Figure 5 shows. In numerous districts there were only Democrat and 
Republican candidates and here the competition space is restricted to the bottom 
boundary of the APT. Some districts with NOP scores of two actually do have one or 
two small parties or individual candidates getting less than 1 per cent of the vote, 
slightly lifting the third and subsequent party vote share off the boundary. Most of the 
remaining outcomes have three observable parties, and all but three results (including 
the few for four or more party districts) are within the competition space feasible with 
three observable parties. In Figure 5 there are just 11 districts where the smaller 
candidates or parties in aggregate achieved more than 10 per cent of the vote. Some 
US districts are so rock-solid that no contested election occurred at all. In 28 districts 
Democratic ascendancy was so guaranteed that no Republican candidate stood against 
them in 2006, and there are 5 reciprocal cases where Democrats did not stand in 
Republican seats. Finally, some apparently larger V3..VN vote shares here actually 
reflect multiple Democratic or Republican party candidates competing against each 
other in exceptional election conditions. The highest V3..VN total occurred when an 
open election with 4 Democratic Party, 2 Republican and several other candidates was  
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Figure 5: The 2006 US House of Representatives election outcomes at district 
level 
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held in a Louisiana district, following the incumbent Democrat representative being 
charged with corruption close to the election. (He none the less topped the poll, and 
subsequently won a run-off election). 
For India we show the range of outcomes in Figure 6, each sub-graph here 
covering districts with different numbers of parties competing. Here the key parties 
accounting for most of the V1 and V2 positions are the Congress bloc and the 
Bharatiya Janata Party/Jan Sangh (BJP for short), or their state or regional allies. 
There  
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Figure 6: The 2004 Indian general election outcomes for districts with different 
numbers of observable parties  
 
(a) Districts with 2 or 3 observable parties        (b) Districts with 4 observable parties              
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Districts with 5 observable parties                (d) Districts with 6 observable parties              
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Figure 6 continued 
 
(e) Districts with 7 or more observable parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are also substantial numbers of Communist victors and state or regional party winners 
who are not aligned with the leading party blocs. 
Clearly in Figure 6a the few two-party districts, and most of the larger number 
of three-party ones, closely conform to Duverger’s law predictions, with the top two 
local parties attracting all but a handful of votes. But a third of the three-party districts 
are much more widely scattered upwards across the feasible ECS space. This vertical 
scattering away from two-party races clearly increases for the four party districts,  
about half of which have 10 per cent or more of the votes going to third or subsequent 
parties.  
 The pattern of vertical scattering is clearly stronger in those districts with 
larger numbers of observable parties contesting the election. The five-party districts in 
Figure 6c still show a clustering at the lowest feasible levels of V3..VN votes shares, 
but now more than half of the outcomes are scattered across the ECS above the 10 per 
cent level for the locally third and subsequent parties. With six observable parties the 
bottom ECS boundary clearly lifts further and the scattering increases. And with 7 or 
more observable parties competing the outcomes are relatively evenly distributed 
vertically, within the leftmost half of the feasible ECS area.  
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Turning next to the British case, Figure 7 shows a pattern that is clearly 
distinct again from the other two countries, starting with the complete absence of two-
horse races, and the very small numbers of three-way contests. 6 There is also clearly a 
single national pattern that applies in a similar way whatever the number of 
observable parties and the associated shape of the ECS area. There is a strong 
horizontal banding of the results whatever the level of V3 to VN aggregate votes, 
although there is a slight upwards drift of votes shares from three to seven plus 
observable parties, most visible in Figure 7d. But this change is modest, with the 
smaller parties always getting from 10 to 31 per cent of all local votes between them. 
Similarly there are some indications that in tight V1-V2 races locally the total vote for 
third and fourth parties tends to be squeezed down a little, but this is not a strong or 
clear-cut effect.  
To sum up so far, we have shown that ECS analysis effectively characterizes 
the USA, India and UK as completely distinct party systems, and uncovers interesting 
patterns of V1V2 outcomes across constituencies, generally showing a slight tendency 
across all three systems for results to scatter more as the number of observable parties 
increases. A clear next step will be to find ways of statistically characterizing the 
patterns shown in Figures 5 to 7. This is not a straightforward topic and lies outside 
the scope of this paper for two main reasons. First, our focus here is solely on the 
counting and patterning of V1V2 slots to characterize the ECS area, but there are other 
possible methods of counting outcome slots that challenge this approach. At a limit, 
we might count all ‘non-equivalent distributions’ of the vote across multiple parties as 
different outcomes, using an equi-probability assumption - an approach that has its 
own advantages and disadvantages. This is a larger meta- 
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Figure 7: The 2005 general election outcomes in Great Britain for districts with 
numbers of observable parties  
 
(a) Seats with 4 observable parties                 (b) Seats with 5 observable parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (c) Seats with 6 observable parties               (d) Seats with 3 and 7 observable  
                                                                                   parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
theory topic, explored in a separate paper. Second, even if could accept the V1V2 
focus here as the optimal basis for analysis, the statistical analysis of outcomes 
patterns within ECS areas is a little complex, although developments in cluster and 
classification techniques from applied mathematics and the biological sciences offer 
useful suggestions here (Gan et al, 2007; Fielding, 2007). 
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3. An alternative approach – the ‘crown’ diagram 
 
For the comparative analysis of elections, the ECS approach above has some 
disadvantages or drawbacks. It is a reductionist way of proceeding, one that requires 
analysts to break down aggregate election outcomes into different layers, locating 
outcomes against competition spaces that vary a lot from 1 to 9 observable parties in 
competition, the levels most commonly found within electoral districts in liberal 
democracies. Accurately fixing the number of observable parties (down to 1 per cent) 
is not a trivial problems in many countries. Even in the USA, many official records of 
district level results are restricted to Democrat, Republican and ‘other’ vote shares, 
and some states (like New York) allow the same candidate to be registered under 
multiple different party labels. In other countries too ‘other party’ vote shares are used 
in most media and academic datasets, and so one needs to go to original official 
records to construct data on observable parties. These difficulties compound the 
tendency noted above, encouraging analysts to construct a raw APT picture from V1 
and V2 data that risks confusing blank spaces created by logical infeasibilities with 
empirical patternings.  
Although valuable in ways set out above, the ECS focus on V1V2 competition 
within each local area also suppresses a lot of information that could flow from 
knowing precisely which party occupies these roles. For instance, in the British 
context the component parts of Figure 7 do not discriminate between those seats 
where the Conservatives and Labour compete in the top two slots and those with other 
patterns. Of course, different icons can be helpfully used in APT and ECS charts to 
indicate this additional kind of information (see Likhtenchtein and Yarmgomskaya, 
2005). But in our three countries the normal concentration of general election 
outcomes still makes visually distinguishing different competitive cases difficult.  
In addition, the traditional Duvergerian analysis of plurality rule systems has 
stressed that the rationale for expecting two-party competition is based not just on 
forces limiting competition within each electoral district, but also on the strong elite 
and mass incentives sustaining an overall nationalization of party politics (Cox, 1997). 
It would be useful to gain a more holistic picture of whole elections by linking the 
visual representation of district outcomes to this second theme.  
 20 
In terms of non-Duvergerian dynamics, Dickson and Scheve (2007) advance 
what we term an ‘invulnerable majority’ conjecture, grounded on the rational choice 
principle that (if at all possible) individuals and groups prefer to be represented by a 
party closer to their own ideological optimum points. In plurality rule systems even if 
a large majority group in a locality splits evenly down the middle, they know that they 
are so numerous that one of their factions will still top the poll and defeat the 
opposition. They are invulnerable to defeat if they split support between just two 
parties or candidates – thereby enhancing the proximity of the winner to the ‘majority 
of the majority’ grouping. Thus large majority groups, most commonly linked to the 
top two parties in a polity, can afford the ‘luxury’ of intra-group competition (see also 
Rabinowitz et al, 1991). By contrast, narrow majority groups (accounting for only 50 
to 66 per cent of local voters) cannot risk a split. Hence we should see local districts 
with up to two thirds of the votes being cast for the largest party, but none above this 
level. This pattern should be especially evident in conditions where social groups in 
local areas are regularly and enduringly politically aligned with the top two political 
parties - as with castes and ethnic groups in India, and social classes in the UK.  
Dickson and Scheve also raise a second, more general conjecture opposed to 
Duvergerian expectations, which we term ‘imitative fragmentation’. Suppose that the 
main local minority Y grouping in a district splits its support across two or more 
different parties or factions, in a way that is predictable, or that re-occurs with a 
reasonably high level of certainty from one election to the next. Under plurality rule, 
the local majority X grouping is now able to split its support further across parties as 
well (should it wish to do so, or have an opportunity to do so) – but only so long as 
X’s largest factional party clearly remains larger than Y’s leading factional party. We 
might be inclined to take the ‘imitative fragmentation’ conjecture most seriously 
wherever the main Dickson-Scheve ‘invulnerable majority’ hypothesis seems to be 
borne out.  
To help explore these varied effects, we introduce a modified variant of the 
APT chart, called the ‘crown’ diagram (for reasons that will be clear later on). We 
first mirror our re-presented APT in its vertical axis, so as to create a double-APT 
chart, shown in Figure 8. We then use the horizontal axis of the double APT to plot all 
district outcomes in terms of the local vote for the top two nationally leading parties 
(or blocs) over their opponents. Seats where national party (or bloc) A leads the other 
leading national party (or bloc) B are shown on the right hand side of the graph, 
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arranged in order of A-B vote shares; and vice versa, seats where party B is ahead of 
A are shown on the left-hand side, going out in order of negative B-A vote shares. 
The A and B labels here simply denote the most important basis for political 
polarization or differentiation between the top two parties or blocs, whatever it is that 
this dimension involve. 7 Where a polity has no clear top or overall dimension 
organizing political competition then this approach may become problematic. But this 
is clearly not the case with our three large plurality-rule systems. On the vertical axis 
we chart support for all other parties (i.e not A and not B) as an aggregate. 
Figure 8 shows how this basic set-up operates. For instance, if party A leads 
party B by 20 per cent, this district’s outcome will be located at + 20 on the horizontal 
axis, and if B leads party A by 10 per cent this will be located at -10. This location 
system applied whether or not parties A and B are locally the top two parties in the 
district being charted, or alternatively one of more of these positions goes to (say) the 
national V3 or national V4. Figure 8 also includes shaded triangle areas showing those 
seats where the top two parties have local majority (50 per cent plus 1) support. 
Within these areas it also shows the Dickson-Scheve 67 per cent limit as a dashed 
line. 
 Where the top two national parties are also the local V1 and V2, then the 
district outcome will tend to occur lower down on the crown diagram; where the top 
two national parties are lower down the rankings in a district (say, the local V3 and 
V4), then the district outcome will be higher up the chart. Notice that shifting away 
from showing the local V1 and V2 support (as in Part 2 above) fundamentally alters 
the diagram. Across electoral districts we are now charting in each district on the 
horizontal axis just the difference in the vote shares there for the nationally leading 
top two parties (aligned along the polity’s main dimension of competition), against the 
combined local vote share for the national third and subsequent parties, shown  on the 
vertical axis.
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Figure 8: The ‘crown’ within the double APT diagram 
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The ‘crown’ area in Figure 8 shows seats outcomes where the third or 
subsequent parties have some potential to win a given district, which requires that: 
- neither of the top two national parties has a vote share of 50 per cent or 
more; and 
- the combined V3…VN vote share must reach or exceed 33.34 per cent. 
No third or subsequent party can win a seat outside the crown. But because the 
vertical axis only shows the aggregate V3..VN vote, which may be fragmented 
between several or many parties, seats inside the crown can still be won by one of the 
top two parties nationally, especially along the bottom edge of the crown area.  
The distribution of seats outcomes within the crown area also responds 
strongly to one of the leading blocs nationally not contesting a given local district. If 
the top two parties nationally are A and B, but B does not stand in a given safe seat 
for A, or does very poorly in winning support there, then the local race is between 
party A and other parties (C, D, E etc) that are nationally ranked third or lower. If the 
V3 to VN vote is split several ways, A can still win; whereas if one of the V3 to VN 
parties is locally dominant there can be a two-horse race, but one that is different from 
the national picture. In practice the latter outcome is more common in plurality rule 
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countries. Here the outcome may be on or close to the top APT boundaries of the 
crown area, on one side or the other.  
Outcomes may also occur on or close to the double APT boundary lower 
down, outside the crown area and in zones where party A or B  has local majority 
support. Those outcomes actually on the APT boundary itself always show that one of 
the top two national parties has not contested that district. Outcomes close to but not 
on the lower APT boundaries may suggest only a ‘no hope’ or nominal local 
campaign by one of the top two parties (A or B) in its rival’s safe seats. 
 Applying this approach, Figure 9 shows the 2006 US House of 
Representatives election outcomes. The crown display spreads out and makes more 
visible the vast bulk of outcomes that occur either on or close to the horizontal axis 
(when the number of observable parties is two), or with a V3 to VN total vote that is 
less than 10 per cent. In line with Duvergerian expectations, these outcomes also 
spread far out along the bottom axis, into 171 districts (two fifths of the total) where 
the largest party gained more than two thirds local majority support in the 2006 
election. So the USA shows no support at all for Dickson and Scheve’s ‘invulnerable 
majority’ prediction.  
Elsewhere, the US pattern exhibits a kind of super-Duvergerian phenomenon 
with clusters of outcomes located on the lower left and right hypotenuses, because one 
or other major party does not stand a candidate against an incumbent (as discussed 
above, page 14). In such seats all the votes not going to the majority party necessarily 
go to smaller parties standing locally, especially to Independents and in some states 
the Greens or the Libertarian Alliance – all ranked third or lower in national vote 
shares. Thus the US display ‘curls up’ somewhat at the extreme edges. (The only 
result in the crown area is the highly unusual Louisiana open election contest 
mentioned previously, with second and subsequent Democratic and Republican party 
candidates here counting within the V3..VN total). 
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Figure 9: The seats outcomes in the US House of Representatives election, 2006 
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Turning to the Indian general election of 2004, Figure 10 shows a radically 
different party system. First, we should note that the horizontal axis scores here are 
based not on the top two parties alone, that is Congress and the Bharatiya Janata  
Party/Jan Sangh (or BJP for short), but on our analysis of the wider grouping of 
India’s multiplicity of parties into the Congress bloc, the BJP bloc, or an ‘other’ 
category. The footnote here describes in detail the party composition of both the top 
two blocs.8  Most state and regional parties are aligned to one of these main blocs and 
participate in their governing coalitions. The key ‘other’ parties here are the 
Communists, and unaligned state parties.  
The two main blocs of Indian parties have both held power nationally for long 
terms in recent decades, overturning the previous pattern where Congress was a 
nationally dominant party, able to govern on its own for three decades after 
independence. Congress’s position was essentially undermined by the growth of more 
and more state and local parties on the one hand, and by the emergence of the BJP as 
the core Hindu party, able to give coherence to anti-Congress forces, on the other.7 In 
the modern period, the bloc partners normally agree not to contest those local seats 
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Figure 10: The seats outcomes in the Indian general election of 2004 
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where another member of the bloc has a viable chance of winning, withdrawing 
candidacies in exchange for a similar quid pro quo in other areas. An agreed pattern of 
reciprocal withdrawals emerges from complex negotiations. These arrangements may 
not cover the full canvass of seats nationally (so that there are some cases of intra-bloc 
competition), but they usually suffice to form the basis for reasonably secure coalition 
government formation after the election. 
 The pattern in Figure 10 clearly shows a large mass of outcomes in districts 
where close BJP and Congress competition predominates, giving the strong clustering 
of seats evident at the bottom centre of the double APT here. Almost half (255) 
districts have a V3…VN vote share under 15 per cent, rising to 299 districts if the cut 
off were 20 per cent. However, the horizontal spread of seats here is concentrated in a 
much narrower horizontal range than in the USA. Dickson and Scheve’s ‘invulnerable 
majority’ prediction is strongly borne across all the Indian districts. In only three BJP 
versus Congress contests did the leading party attract support from more than 67 per 
cent of local voters (and then not by much). Leads of 30 per cent or more in 
competitions between the top two parties occurred in only 13 seats anywhere on the 
chart. 
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 The other key pattern in Figure 10 is a strong and wide ‘mushroom cloud’ of 
results, straggling upwards from the base of two-party contests into the crown. Within 
the crown itself the scattering of results clearly increases, with many outcomes there 
occurring on or near to the hypotenuse boundaries of the double APT. This reflects 
especially decisions by the BJP not to stand candidates against (or not to campaign 
strongly against) state or ethnic parties that are competing with the Congress bloc. (As 
the former dominant party Congress is somewhat more active in ‘no hope’ seats). The 
pattern of district outcomes here, allied with the large number of districts with seven 
or more observable parties, suggests that ‘imitative fragmentation’ could have taken 
place in India, despite the impacts of the party-blocs in re-simplifying competition in 
most seats. Tracking given district outcomes over time could shed more light here (a 
task made easier by the freezing of most electoral boundaries since 1971). 
If we re-presented Figure 10 using the bottom axis just to map the BJP and 
Congress core party votes, then the distribution would become even more vertically 
differentiated and ‘top heavy’ – because we would now be counting Congress-allied 
and BJP-allied parties as lower-ranked parties, forming part of the V3..VN group, 
instead of in the top two blocs. Unfortunately because of the selective withdrawals 
way of creating coalitions, this would also mean increasing numbers of missing data 
cases for the core parties, piling up more cases on the APT boundaries, and creating 
substantial cases where neither core party is competing, so that we could not locate 
these districts on the crown diagram at all. Accordingly, the bloc representation in 
Figure 10 seems to be the correct one both analytically and substantively. 
 We turn next to the British general election of 2005 where a third, 
radically different pattern is evident. Figure 11 shows that there are no constituencies 
where the aggregate vote share of parties ranked third or lower nationally (V3 to VN) 
is below 15 per cent. In fact, there are only a few cases where it is less than 20 per 
cent. Essentially then the whole bottom third of the double APT area is empty. The 
strong nationalization of British politics is evident, with the top two national parties 
contesting (almost) all seats and garnering at least 5-10 per cent support almost 
everywhere. Thus there are almost no British outcomes on or even close to the APT 
boundary lines, bar three exceptional cases.9 
Partly reflecting this effect, there are also only a handful of heartland seats 
where one of the top two Labour and Conservative parties wins more than two thirds 
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Figure 11: The seats outcomes in the 2005 general election in Great Britain 
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support. The ‘invulnerable majority’ hypothesis is clearly supported here, since only 
six seats show V1 levels above two thirds. This is chiefly because the entire array has 
risen so far within the double APT, suggesting that different (far more nationalized) 
mechanisms are at work from those in the Indian case. And in the UK (unlike India) 
there are still many seats won by the top two parties with leads exceeding 30 per cent 
over their main rival. 
Our display also distinguishes between seats won by each of the top two 
parties, and by one of the parties ranked parties ranked third or lower nationally, 
chiefly the Liberal Democrats and the nationalist parties in Scotland (SNP) and Wales 
(Plaid Cymru). As expected most of these seats occur in the upper part of the crown. 
In the lower part of the crown there are a mixture of wins for one of the top two 
parties and the Liberal Democrats, with a somewhat heavier clustering of seats with 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat competition noticeable on the right. 
 This all leaves the bulk of seats with close Conservative-Labour competition 
squeezed into a crescent shape below the crown, bounded underneath by the 15 per 
cent level and on the flanks by the 67% vote shares for each of the top two parties. 
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Inside the crown area itself there are substantial numbers of major party seats. In the 
Conservative-lead half of the chart, the crescent of district outcomes seems to extend 
along the APT boundary with a less populated ‘hollow’ area in the middle. But on the 
Labour-lead half there is a more even distribution of outcomes. 
 Again the British case may seem far removed from the other two countries. 
But we can extend the analysis here to show that this was not always the case, because 
the crown diagram is also well-adapted to analysing over-time changes in party 
systems. Figure 12 shows that in 1955, at the height of the two-party system in the 
UK, the patterns then were far more similar to those for the USA now. A large 
majority of district outcomes showed only two party competition, and hence lay on 
the bottom axis itself. Substantial numbers of MPs received support from more than 
two thirds of local electorates. Only in a minority of exceptional seats did MPs receive 
less than an absolute majority of local votes, even where there were raised levels of 
V3 to VN levels. At the same time there are also points of continuity with the Indian 
picture here, especially the rather clear separation between the bulk of two-party-only 
seats and those where third parties were still competing and garnering votes – 
essentially in the raised fringe of seats where the Liberal party maintained some hard-
core support and could still muster candidates. The most prominent upwards 
straggling seats in 1955 represented areas in the Scottish and Welsh periphery where 
the Liberals retained their few MPs.  
 Looking across the cases presented so far suggests some evolutionary 
trajectories for plurality rule systems. For the UK the pathway would be as shown in 
Figure 13. Part (a) here shows a plurality rule system that starts out in a configuration 
highly consistent with Duverger’s Law, with all observations on or close to the 
bottom axis, and with many districts showing large majority wins for one party or 
another. Figure 13b suggests that over time the breadth of the core cluster above 
should tend to shrink, with the ‘invulnerable majority’ effect leading to some 
fragmentation of V1 in ‘safe’ districts with large social group majorities. This would 
automatically producing a ‘curling up’ of the outcomes pattern at the edges into a 
saucer pattern. Figure 13c shows that as this process progressively affects seats with 
smaller majorities for one of the two main parties, so the saucer shape could curl over 
completely across the top of the crown area, leaving perhaps a ‘hollow centre’. The 
aging of a two-party system should also tend to shift outcomes progressively upwards 
and away from the horizontal axis, as has clearly happened in Great Britain. These  
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Figure 12: The seats outcomes in the 1955 general election in Great Britain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trends may well continue further, as they have in all British elections using 
proportional representation (on which see Figure 15 below).10 In this case, Figure 13d 
would represent the final stage of evolution for the UK, where perhaps some 
Duvergerian clustering of outcomes chiefly into contests between the top two parties 
still remains, but the whole distribution has shifted inside the crown area alone and 
may be hard to distinguish from patterns in multi-party systems (where a similar 
focusing on the largest parties is also common). 
We do not at this stage have the over-time data available to undertake a similar 
hypothesizing exercise for the USA or India. Tentatively we might think of the 
American case as a rather exceptional deviation on the evolutionary path, a plurality 
rule political system that has got frozen into a kind of self-sustaining, super-
Duvergerian track, which the analysis above shows displays no invulnerable majority 
effect. It also has a different kind of  ‘curl up’ effect, where at high levels of support 
for a majority party locally the other main rival party no longer non-contests quite a 
few seats, creating ‘artificially’ larger votes for the only opponents left. But such 
outcomes remain securely within majority-win area for one or other of the two largest 
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We might think of India as perhaps having gone from a lop-sided dominant 
party system with a hegemonic Congress presence on two paths. First, the  
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Figure 13: Hypothesized ideal-type stages in the evolution of the UK’s plurality 
rule system over time 
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development of two-bloc Congress-BJP competition in a majority of seats (with 
restricted presence of other parties) retains a strong Duvergerian clustering despite 
party fragmentation (albeit with no large-majority outcomes). But this occupies a 
narrow base and no large-majority seats remain. Second, the fragmentation of votes in 
close to two fifths of seats progressively created a strong upward dispersion of seats 
outcomes, the top of the mushroom cloud in Figure 10. In a related fashion, in other 
countries where centrifugal tendencies tear at the support base for the original top two 
parties, producing regional oppositions, we might expect that there will be a more 
pronounced ‘curling over’ of seats distributions than that shown for the UK, as 
perhaps in Canada at different periods.  
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The crown diagram (and the double APT chart) are also highly suitable for charting 
the development of party competition across different regions within a single country. 
Figure 14 shows the 2010 general election outcomes in Great Britain across four 
contrasting government standard regions. The top two here are the Conservative-
dominated south east; and the Labour-dominated north west (although 2010 was a 
Tory year). The bottom two here show four-party plus systems with a more marked 
upward scatter of outcomes because of the presence of nationalist parties and strong 
rural Liberal Democrat support. Scotland was Labour dominated in 2010, but with a 
strong SNP and Liberal Democrat presence, while Wales by comparison showed more 
Conservative strength in some areas. 
 Finally, the crown diagram can also be applied to other voting systems. For 
single member district elections using the Alternative Vote, first preferences are 
charted in an identical manner. For List PR elections, the number of electoral districts 
is always considerably less, so that the detail shown in the Crown diagram is greatly 
reduced. But again application is straightforward. Figure 14 shows the outcomes in 
eleven regional constituencies used in Great Britain across all the European 
parliament elections under the Blair and Brown governments. The last two sets of 
outcomes were solidly within the crown area, with the effective number of parties 
reaching 6.5 or more in every region by 2009. There were marked changes in patterns 
of behaviour across all the English regions across this time period (whereas Wales and 
Scotland remained more consistent). In both the later elections two parties to the right 
of the Conservatives and favouring withdrawal from the EU and stronger immigration 
controls between them won nearly a quarter of the vote (the UK Independence Party 
accounting for two thirds of this vote share, and the British National Party a third), 
while the Greens also did well under List PR. 
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Figure 14: Regional patterns of party competition in four British regions at the 
2010 general election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The outcomes of the European Parliament elections in Great Britain 
in 1999, 2004 and 2009, using regional list PR systems 
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Conclusions 
 
Within plurality rule election systems, the district-level comparison of general 
election outcomes has been increasingly central in the debate about competing 
Duvergerian expectations and opposing mechanisms favouring party fragmentation 
(such as the ‘invulnerable majority’ effect).  A few previous analysts have cumulated 
election data covering many separate district contests (some 58,000 results in the case 
of Chhibber and Kollman, 2004, Ch. 2), yet confined their analysis to means and 
standard deviations, presenting little of the richness of outcomes patterning that can be 
accessed by better methods of charting. We have demonstrated that it is very helpful 
to visually chart both  
- a reductionist picture of V1V2 competition in races with different numbers 
of party in competition, shown in the ECS view, and giving insights into 
the aggregated, layer-cake nature of general election outcomes; and 
- information about how district outcomes relate to the most important basis 
for political alignments and how the holistic patterns vary across election 
outcome, shown in the crown diagram.  
A careful analyst will always consider both displays.11  
In substantive terms, Duvergerian expectations of strong two-party focussing 
in plurality rule systems extend to a psychological effect during the campaign period 
for voters not to support candidates standing from non-top two (or non-major) parties 
(Prediction B in Table 1 above). Our analysis demonstrates that this prediction is 
broadly borne out for the USA, but that it is now widely inapplicable in both India and 
Great Britain, albeit in different ways. India demonstrates strong Duvergerian 
conformity in a large sub-set of districts, but extensive vertical scattering of results 
within most ECS areas and the crown. The British party system shows a strongly 
uniform, nationwide expansion of third and subsequent party voting, with results 
clustering just below and into the crown. While the USA shows no signs at all of the 
opposing ‘invulnerable majority’ effect, both India and the UK demonstrate strong 
conformity with the Dickson and Scheve rational choice prediction, albeit in different 
ways. The small increases in the vertical scatter of outcomes across ECS areas in the 
UK, and stronger effects in India, also suggest that when small parties compete and 
attract enough votes to make changes in the numbers of observable parties, they may 
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help to trigger much larger changes in the comparative situations of all parties locally, 
by changing the feasible competition space.12  
 Charting tools have been very important in scientific progress because they 
allow users to access information about a large number of data points simultaneously, 
and in a fashion that is especially useful for pattern-finding and generating 
hypotheses. Visual representations of multiple outcomes in general elections are 
especially useful in suggesting a range of initial synoptic characterizations of party 
systems, grounded in large amounts of information about multiple district outcomes. 
By expressing more of the richness of data and information available to us, they can 
provide the exploratory seed beds for hypothesis formulation (as Figure 13 
demonstrates). Legitimate charting tools applied to rich information can also help to 
illuminate aspects of complex, multi-dimensional data arrangements that are 
otherwise hard to capture using single statistical indices or even bundles of 
complementing indices. Hence better visual representations often serve as a key 
jumping-off point for developing appropriate data-clustering analyses (Gan et al, 
2007; Fielding, 2007).  
However, visual patterns alone can be misleading. So in the next stage of 
development it will also be essential to sort out statistical methods attuned to the 
analysis of this rich field of information, capable of rigorously distinguishing between 
random and patterned (non-entropic) effects, and able to characterize successfully the 
information content conveyed by any patterning. Our focus here on competition space 
defined in terms of V1V2 slots is also itself contestable, representing a limit view, the 
simplest possible characterization of the spaces within which feasible outcomes can 
be expected to occur. At an opposing limit, taking account of every possible 
combination of vote shares, we could chart outcomes set against all the ‘non-
equivalent distributions’ of party support for each V1V2 slot in the ECS area, that is 
all outcomes feasible on an equi-probability basis, as we do in further work. In 
between these two poles there are also many other possible positions. Resolving these 
conceptual and methodological issues will be key for deriving appropriate null 
hypotheses of where we should expect to see outcomes distributed across the ECS 
area, and hence of the extent of non-entropic patterning that we actually observe, both 
in plurality rule elections and in other, proportional systems. 
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NOTES 
 
* Author note: We thank Christopher Dunleavy, Simon Hix, Christian List, Ken 
Benoit. Michael Laver, Simon Hug, Keith Dowding, John Dryzek, seminar groups at 
the PSA Annual Conference and the School of Politics and International Relations at 
the Australian National University, and especially two referees for Party Politics for 
many helpful comments at various stages of this paper’s development. 
 
1.  In fact, it might be possible to use a simplex representation somewhat effectively 
in multi-party conditions in plurality rule elections where there are three clear leading 
parties and a range of other parties sharing a minority vote share (say below 10 per 
cent) between them, as in the British general election of 2010 (Dunleavy, 2010b). 
Essentially the three axes are here recalibrated to run from 0 to 100-x% where x is the 
aggregate share of the fourth and subsequent parties, whose vote shares are not shown 
explicitly. This still lets the diagram focus effectively on the fluctuations of support 
between the top three main party contenders. 
2.  Because Nagayama’s original paper was in Japanese, and has not been translated, 
the key English sources for this attribution is Reed (2001 pp. 216-7). See also Reed 
(1990) and (2003). 
3. Of course, as more parties enter the system the maximum vote share for the 
smallest party in the system is 100 per cent divided by the number of parties. This 
limit shrinks, albeit at a slower and slower rate, to 33.3 per cent for V3 with three 
parties, 25 per cent for V4 with 4 parties, 20 per cent for V5 with five parties, , and so 
on. 
4. In addition, the ‘all possibilities triangle’ (APT) label is not a neologism or 
departure from conventional usage for its own sake, but also serves two further key 
roles: (i) It alerts users to the fact that the orientation and axis labelling originally used 
by Nagyama are both changed in the analysis below. And (ii) The ‘all possibilities’ 
label usefully stresses key continuities between the analysis of electoral outcomes 
here and a wide range of parallel ways of analysing political competition using the 
APT, such as power index approaches, discussed in related work. 
5. Occasionally analysts may lose sight of the causal link running from an increased 
number of observable parties to ENP. For instance, Chhibber and Kollman (2004, p, 
46)  present a graph with ENP as the horizontal axis (independent) variable apparently 
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influencing average third party votes shares on the vertical axis. The correct influence 
is the other way around, showing that V3 average vote shares above 20 per cent are 
compatible with any level of ENP above 2.75. 
6. For more background on the 2005 general election outcomes see Dunleavy and 
Margetts (2005). 
7. In the USA the dominance of Democrat-Republican competition fits fairly easily 
into a left-right frame, as does the historicalbeit now almost hollowed-out) Labour-
Conservative predominance in Westminster politics. Both these countries (in different 
ways) also show a strong focusing of political life directly on the top two parties. 
Indian politics now illustrates an interesting pattern found in other modern 
democracies (such as Italy and perhaps France), where two main blocs of linked 
parties (more permanent than coalitions) regularly compete, each bloc having a main 
party at its core but several other components (or in India’s case many other 
components). The Congress bloc versus BJP bloc dimension primarily has many 
ethnic group, caste politics and secularist-versus-Hindu components, but has some 
left-right connotations also. Positing a clear top dimension of here is simply a 
convenient simplification, and it should be crystal clear that we are not prejudging the 
substantive content of the dimension in each case. Our approach adapts to any other 
form of content for the main dimension, and to the single dimension itself being a 
strongly composite one or essentially just an analytic construct. 
8.   The compositions of the two main blocs are as follows. The core party of the 
Congress bloc is the Indian National Congress, and allied bloc parties are Arunachal 
Congress, Lok Jan Shakti Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal (Laloo), Nationalist Congress, 
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, Telengana Raya Samiti, Pattali Makkal Katchi, Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam, Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Congress 
Independent, and other Congress party allies. The core party of the BJP bloc is 
Bharatiya Janata Party/Jan Sangh, and the allied bloc parties are Telugu 
Desam/Telugu Desam (NAIDU), Janata Dal/Janata Party, Shivsena, Shiromani Akali 
Dal/Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal), All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 
Janata Dal/Janata Party, Trinamul Congress, BJP-supported Independent, and other 
BJP party allies. For additional background, see Diwakar (2006, and 2007), Sridharen 
(1997), Chhibber and Murali (2006). 
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9. These are the Speaker’s seat (where main opposition parties did not stand, but 
smaller parties did); and two seats where Labour failed to stand a candidate through 
errors.  
10. See also Dunleavy and Margetts (2001) and Dunleavy (2005). 
11. Because the crown diagram aggregates third and subsequent party vote shares, it is 
important to bear in mind that (unlike an ENPvotes score) it does not differentiate 
between situations such as (40, 30, 30) versus (40, 30, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5). However, in 
ECS terms the first situation is in the plot for districts with 3 observable parties, and 
the second situation in the plot for 8 observable parties. 
.12. For useful analytic perspectives on new parties, see Hug, 1996 and 2001; Dewan, 
2007; and Rabinowitz et al, 1991. For empirical cases see Sikk (2005), Szajkowski 
(1991) and Bélanger (2004). 
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